mypanera If policymakers believe that private agents anticipate low inflation, they have an incentive to adopt expansionist monetary policy (where the marginal benefit of increasing the economic output exceeded the marginal cost of inflation), however, assuming private agents have rational expectations, they know that policymakers have this incentive. Hence, private agents know that if they anticipate low inflation, an expansionist policy will be adopted which led to an increase in inflation. Consequently, (unless policymakers can make their announcement of low inflation credible), private agents expect high inflation. anticipation is fulfilled through adaptive expectation (wage-setting behavior), then, there is higher inflation (without the benefit of increased production). Hence, unless credible announcements can be made, an expansive monetary policy will fail.
Announcements can be made credible in a variety of ways. One is to establish an independent central bank with low inflation targets (but no output targets). Hence, private agents know that inflation will be low because it is set by an independent body. Central banks can be given incentives to meet the target (eg, a larger budget, bonus reward for the head of the bank) to improve the reputation and signals a strong commitment to policy objectives. Reputation is an important element in the implementation of monetary policy. But the idea of reputation should not be confused with commitment.
- školený personál s dlouholetými zkušenostmi,
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